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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW  
OF  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAY ODIERNO  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 (b)(6) This is (b)(6) the  
3 Writing Historian for III Corps from CMH. Today is 13  
4 February 2008. I am at the Joint Visitors Bureau in  
5 Camp Victory outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and I am about  
6 to interview Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, the  
7 Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

8 Sir, it is at the end of the Corps' nearly  
9 15 months deployment in Iraq, and I would like to ask  
10 if you would reflect back for a minute and think what  
11 were some of the pivotal decisions or key decisions  
12 for you during the course of the 15 months.

13 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Well, I think first  
14 was, obviously, the decision as we came in initially  
15 to really -- We had to do a complete review of our  
16 operations plan when we came in. But the Corps was  
17 scheduled to go through -- Really, it was about  
18 transition. It was about continuing the transition to  
19 the Iraqi Security Forces.

20 In fact, the plan had been published right  
21 before we had gotten here by V Corps to continue to  
22 transition -- expand transition teams and reduce our

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1 combat capability.

2 So when I first got in here, though, we  
3 realized that what we were seeing was a significant  
4 rise in sectarian violence, significant rise of  
5 instability in Iraq. So we had to make the decision  
6 whether we would shift our (Inaudible).

7 So I had discussions with General Casey,  
8 and the guidance he gave me was try to make a decisive  
9 difference inside of Baghdad itself. We then started  
10 to -- We made a decision to change course and change  
11 how we were doing business. So that was the first  
12 fundamental decision that I had to make.

13 The second decision, I thought, turned out  
14 to be more decisive, though it is at a bit lower  
15 level, was then some of the things we decided to do  
16 such as pushing everybody out into Joint Security  
17 Stations, combat outposts, and we made that decision  
18 late December and began executing that in early  
19 January.

20 Then it was the surge, then deciding to  
21 request additional forces with significant discussions  
22 with General Casey. I think one of the decisive

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1 decisions we made was to have decision points and a  
2 plan to bring five brigades forward, as well as the  
3 decision to add two Marine battalions in Anbar  
4 Province to exploit the success in Anbar.

5 (b)(6) Let me ask you about that  
6 decision. Was there an option or was an option  
7 discussed about bringing the five brigades in  
8 simultaneously?

9 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Initially we wanted to  
10 -- What we found out early on is the Army cannot meet  
11 that timeline. So they told us that the timeline they  
12 could meet was about one a month.

13 (b)(6) Right.

14 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: So then what we did  
15 is we then based our decision points off of what the  
16 Army said they could provide to us, which was about  
17 one brigade per month for five months.

18 (b)(6) All right, sir.

19 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: So what we did then  
20 is we actually pushed them a little bit faster than  
21 they initially had planned to, but we never -- We were  
22 never able to consider five brigades once we were told

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1 that could not be done by the Army.

2 (b)(6)

Right. Let me go back to your

3 second decision on the JSSes and the COPs. I have an

4 interview with (b)(6) the G3 of MND-Baghdad,

5 who says that you and General Casey visited General

6 Fil (Phonetic) <sup>at</sup> ~~and~~ General Fil's office at Camp

7 Liberty sometime -- He didn't pinpoint the exact date,

8 but it was, he said, before Christmas.

9 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes, it probably  
10 was.

11 (b)(6)

And at that point General Fil

12 apparently sketched out on a napkin or there was some

13 kind of a napkin sketch of what you wanted in a Joint

14 Security Station.

15 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Well, I don't  
16 remember specifically, but yes. We went down and had

17 a very -- a discussion about establishing Joint

18 Security Stations in and around Baghdad, and then

19 General Fil -- We had a long discussion. General Fil

20 started writing some notes down and said this is what

21 I think I want to do, and this is how I think we

22 should do it. We all came to agreement that we will

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1 start. I would trust his memory on that.

2 (b)(6) Right. He said he wasn't  
3 present, but --

4 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes, but I think  
5 that is probably right.

6 (b)(6) Okay. All right, sir. Then  
7 those are three decisions on --

8 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes. And then the  
9 next one was: I realized after we made the decision  
10 on the brigades, there were some enablers that I felt  
11 we absolutely had to have, the first being a fourth  
12 division headquarters.

13 I felt that the battle space that MND-  
14 Baghdad had was too complex and too large for them.  
15 What I wanted them to do was focus on Baghdad, the  
16 center of Baghdad city, not Baghdad Province. They  
17 also had Karbala and Najaf and several other places  
18 that came under their command.

19 I just thought the span of control was way  
20 too great for the amount of forces they had and what  
21 I really wanted them to focus on. So I realized I  
22 needed another division.

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1                   So I went back to the Army and said I need  
2                   another division headquarters. I wanted it in March.  
3                   They told me they couldn't get it here until April.  
4                   So the 3d ID got here in April.

5                   I think that was significant in the  
6                   execution of the surge. It enabled Baghdad to focus  
7                   really hard on the ten security districts inside of  
8                   Baghdad, and it also gave me a headquarters that could  
9                   focus on the southern belts that affected Baghdad, the  
10                  Arab Jabour region, out in Yusufiyah, the Momahdiya  
11                  (Phonetic) area.

12                  So it was a very important decision in my  
13                  mind. Then in addition to that, we asked for another  
14                  combat aviation brigade. Now that came in with the 3d  
15                  Infantry Division, and that then gave us the  
16                  additional airframes to do air assault operations,  
17                  attack helicopter operations, air-ground integration.

18                  So I thought those enablers really made a  
19                  significant difference. So I thought that was a key  
20                  decision that we made early on.

21                  The next one was I wanted -- I knew early  
22                  on in March -- February/March that Baqubah and Diyala

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1 Province was a problem. I had experience up there  
2 with the division commander.

3 As I went there and visited, I knew that  
4 al Qaeda had really taken over and had a very strong  
5 influence in this area.

6 (b)(6) And that is where you had  
7 commanded <sup>as a</sup> Division Commander.

8 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes. I owned that.  
9 So I could just tell that there was something not  
10 right there, and I had discussion with the local  
11 commanders, and they confirmed that they had seen the  
12 shift over the last six months. So, clearly, al Qaeda  
13 was moving from Anbar out to Diyala.

14 So what we did was I knew I had to go in  
15 there, but I couldn't quite do it yet, because my  
16 first priority was Baghdad, although I knew Diyala  
17 affected Baghdad.

18 So what we did is I had to wait for the  
19 surge forces to complete getting here in-country, and  
20 once we got to the fourth brigade, I then made the  
21 decision that the -- because we had reinforced  
22 Baghdad.

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1 I was able to use my operational reserve,  
2 which was 3d Brigade, 2d Stryker, to conduct and  
3 reinforce and conduct a significant clearing operation  
4 inside of Baqubah. So one of the major decisions I  
5 had, was committing my operational reserve, which was  
6 working inside of Baghdad, to shift that to Diyala and  
7 Baqubah.

8 (b)(6) What I have seen on the  
9 records -- and, actually, you discussed this also in  
10 an earlier interview, but in March there was a  
11 commitment of one Stryker battalion.

12 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: That's right.

13 (b)(6) And then in May the Brigade  
14 headquarters, I think.

15 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: I think it was in  
16 June.

17 (b)(6) In June, June. Okay. And  
18 that was -- You consider that one of your key  
19 decisions, to reinforce MND-North, General Nixon?

20 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: And clear Baqubah --

21 (b)(6) Clear Baqubah.

22 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: -- of al Qaeda.

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1 That was really -- and that is what their mission was,  
2 and it was called Arrowhead Ripper, was the operation.

3 (b)(6) Right.

4 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Which turned out to  
5 be a significant operation.

6 (b)(6) Right. yes, sir.

7 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: That became the  
8 basis of Phantom Thunder, and that was the first  
9 subset where that was ours to conduct, to clear what  
10 I considered to be the safe havens and sanctuaries  
11 outside of Baghdad. So it was Baqubah, Arab Jabour,  
12 3d Infantry Division, Tarmia (Phonetic), Taji area by  
13 42 Stryker and 11 Cavalry.

14 So that was a key operation that we began.  
15 Then the next one --

16 (b)(6) Sir, let me ask you: On  
17 Phantom Thunder I know that the way I've seen the  
18 operations -- in fact, you've characterized them as  
19 really small unit operations, and you constructed a  
20 Corps operation, Phantom Thunder, as kind of an  
21 umbrella for all the division operations, brigade  
22 operations. Is that right, sir?

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1 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes, but it was --  
2 Yes, it is true, and the focus of this was eliminating  
3 safe havens and sanctuaries that had once been  
4 established.

5 (b)(6) In the Belt areas?

6 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: In the Belt areas.  
7 That's right. And then, for example then, in Baghdad  
8 they continued to go after the truck-car bomb  
9 networks.

10 (b)(6) All right, sir.

11 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: And then the  
12 decision to bring -- And then the next decision was to  
13 ask for the 13th MEU. Originally, it was scheduled --  
14 They told me I could have it for 90 days, and I had to  
15 decide when I wanted it.

16 So I made the decision to bring it in in  
17 June, because then I would be maximizing -- The surge  
18 of the five U.S. brigades was complete. Two Marine  
19 battalions were here. Then by bringing in the MEU,  
20 that means for the next 90 days I would be able to  
21 surge -- I would be able to conduct operations with a  
22 maximum amount of force as possible.

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1           So the MEU became a major part of Phantom  
2 Thunder, as they also cleared the safe havens and  
3 sanctuaries in and around Lake Barthar (Phonetic) in  
4 the Ramadi-Fallujah-Haditha-Habbaniya area. So that  
5 was the other piece.

6           (b)(6)

All right, sir.

7           LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: The next decision,  
8 which kind of happened simultaneous to this but in a  
9 different realm, was the reconciliation piece, the  
10 fact that we had watched what had happened in Anbar in  
11 the spring.

12           It had started earlier, but it really --  
13 After we finished the clearance of Ramadi, it like  
14 fell off a cliff, the amount of reconciliation and how  
15 fast we moved toward peace with the sheikhs coming  
16 forward wanting to work with us.

17           We then started getting signs that other  
18 people wanted to do this. So we had to make a  
19 decision on how we would do this. So I made the  
20 decision to form a reconciliation cell.

21           I made the decision to reach out to the  
22 Concerned Local Citizens and to establish programs

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1 where we would hire them as community watch types for  
2 local areas, and our comment was we would much rather  
3 have them -- Instead of pointing the weapons at us, we  
4 would rather point them at al Qaeda.

5 What we started to see here was a mindset  
6 within the Iraqi people about rejecting al Qaeda, and

7 14c

8 We started seeing this is in the conversations and  
9 engagements we were doing.

10 So we really thought this was the time to  
11 work -- really go out and really start working hard on  
12 reconciliation. I think that was a major decision,  
13 the fact that we made the decision to do this.

14 So what I then had to do is establish  
15 right and left limits for the commanders and let them  
16 execute it at a local level, because in each case it  
17 would be done very differently, depending on the area  
18 it were done.

19 So that launched the reconciliation  
20 effort, which I think has contributed significantly as  
21 well to longer term stability and security.

22 (b)(6)

Yes, sir. I have seen the

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1 growth of the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local  
2 Citizens. It has really grown exponentially since  
3 June.

4 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: It has. I mean, it  
5 is close to 80,000.

6 (b)(6) Right.

7 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: And you know, it's  
8 interesting. Then I really went into a large  
9 engagement process with the government of Iraq on this  
10 for over a three-month period, three to four-month  
11 period, to really get them to understand this and  
12 worked with them.

13 I spent a lot of time working with them to  
14 understand the program. They set up their own  
15 reconciliation cell. We started working very hard  
16 with them, and we have slowly moved this forward. I  
17 think we are at a point now where it is starting to  
18 move forward at a quicker pace. We now have 10,000  
19 that have been hired of these Sons of Iraq (Inaudible)  
20 into the Security Forces.

21 So I think it is really starting to move  
22 forward now. We still have some work -- more work to

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1 do.

2 MR. EPLEY: Yes, sir. So would you say  
3 that, when you rendered that report to General  
4 Petraeus on your assessment to him before his  
5 September testimony, would you consider that critical?

6 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: It was. No, it was  
7 very critical. We spent a lot of time conducting our  
8 assessment. I had the division commanders provide me  
9 assessment, and I brought a group together and really  
10 took about 30 days to do an assessment.

11 I initially was very concerned that I was  
12 not going to be able to give an accurate assessment,  
13 because the surge really didn't come to its full  
14 fruition until 15 June, and I was giving him an  
15 assessment at the end of August, basically.

16 (b)(6) Right.

17 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: So I was worried it  
18 was only 45 days. But I started to feel -- What I  
19 started to see by the end of August is some trends  
20 beginning to show, and I wasn't convinced they were  
21 trends that would be absolutely deniable, but they  
22 were trends that we were starting to see.

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1           We were starting to see a drop in  
2 violence. We were starting to see a drop in  
3 casualties. We were starting to see a drop in  
4 civilian casualties. We were starting to see more  
5 people coming across and wanting to work with us. We  
6 saw more people rejecting al Qaeda.

7           We saw our campaign against Shia  
8 extremists -- that's another decision I need to talk  
9 about, about Shia extremists -- was starting to really  
10 help.

11           So we started to see these signs.  
12 Although I was not yet convinced, it was enough that  
13 I thought I could -- I felt that we were making enough  
14 progress that could assist in his testimony, which  
15 really said we think we can get down to 15 brigades by  
16 the end of July of 2008, and that has helped. The  
17 trends have continued to show that.

18           So I thought that assessment we did was  
19 pretty good. What I learned from it, though, it is  
20 very hard to -- You know, six months, two years, is a  
21 long time in Iraq, and a lot of things can change. So  
22 you have to watch very carefully how you conduct those

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1 assessments.

2 If I could go back to late December/early  
3 January, one of the other key decisions we made was  
4 that we were going to go very dynamically after the  
5 Sunni -- I mean after the Shia extremists inside of  
6 Sadr City, all around Baghdad.

9  
Go after  
Shia Extremists  
in Baghdad

7 We had to do hard work in working --  
8 General Casey and myself did a lot of work in  
9 convincing Prime Minister Maliki to allow us to do  
10 this.

11 In the past, he had not allowed Pete  
12 Corelli (Phonetic) and V Corps to do that, and we  
13 showed him what was happening. We showed him the  
14 damage to Sadr City itself, the fact of what it was  
15 having on security, stability. He then allowed us  
16 through coordination with him to conduct a significant  
17 amount of operations.

18 So from January through April, I would  
19 say, we conducted four or five operations at night in  
20 Sadr City and eastern Baghdad, going after the leaders  
21 of these organizations. There was a combined special  
22 operations and conventional force operations that

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1 allowed us to do this.

2 In my mind -- and we continued to do this.  
3 Although we slowed down, we continued to do it  
4 throughout the summer all the way up until the end of  
5 August, and I think this played a huge role in the  
6 ceasefire by Sadr.

7 The operations that we conducted, I  
8 believe, really drove them to be significantly  
9 disorganized. They had a lot of leaders. They  
10 had lost control of the forces. They were acting  
11 independently.

12 So I think all of those drove in part to  
13 Sadr ultimately asking for a ceasefire, culminating in  
14 when they were in Karbala and there were Shia and Shia  
15 fighting, which actually damaged some of the mosques  
16 there, because he had lost so much control, based on  
17 us taking out a lot of the leadership.

18 So I think that all played a role in it.  
19 So I think that was a key decision as well.

20 (b)(6) All right. How about the fall  
21 -- let's say, after the assessment, General Petraeus  
22 comes back, and I know you are looking at ramping down

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1 the number of brigades.

2 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: The first thing that  
3 we did is we started -- What we still wanted to do is  
4 pursue al Qaeda.

5 (b)(6) Right.

6 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: So through the fall  
7 our mission was to pursue al Qaeda. In addition, we  
8 started to really shift a bit from lethal to non-  
9 lethal operations. We still were doing targeted  
10 precision operations, but we were really starting to  
11 shift to providing basic security.

12 What we really started to realize is, now  
13 that we have started to provide security, our focus  
14 changed a bit to reconciliation, to providing  
15 services, to trying to provide jobs, and we really  
16 started to shift a focus toward there in the fall;  
17 because we thought, if we could get this, it would  
18 add even more security, because we were seeing  
19 security improve, but we realized in order for it to  
20 improve some more, we had to fix some of the other  
21 elements, again try to develop a reconciliation  
22 program for Sunni and Shia, try to again create

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1 opportunities for jobs, give them basic services,  
2 which is what they were lacking, electricity, water,  
3 sewage, etcetera.

4 So we really started to work that, and all  
5 the time doing this clearly was working with the  
6 government of Iraq as well.

7 I am going to go back with one more  
8 decision.

9 (b)(6) That's all right.

10 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: There's quite a few.  
11 One of the other key decisions that was made by  
12 General Casey after the President's meeting with the  
13 Prime Minister in November was to stand up the Baghdad  
14 Operational Command, and we worked hard in December  
15 and January as well on how that would be formed, how  
16 it would be organized, what would be the  
17 relationships, and I think a key decision was  
18 establishing the Baghdad Operational Command.

19 It was -- In the beginning we weren't sure  
20 how well it would do. We worked very closely -- I  
21 established a cell to work with them. I assigned a  
22 two-star General, basically, to help train them, and

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1 I spent a lot of time over there personally to stand  
2 up this organization.

3 One of the surprises has been how well  
4 they have done, how fast they have improved, and how  
5 well the Iraqi and U.S. forces have worked together  
6 under this arrangement. So I think that was one of  
7 the key decisions. Putting an Iraqi in charge of  
8 Baghdad security --

9 (b)(6) General Aboud.

10 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: -- General Aboud --  
11 was a key decision. That has helped significantly, in  
12 my mind.

13 (b)(6) And actually, I have already  
14 written a lot on that, and I see, when you -- You  
15 know, on 1 March it became basically an all Iraqi  
16 operation, still had the advisory team in there, but  
17 you worked hand in hand with General Aboud on that.

18 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: I saw -- Yesterday  
19 he showed me a piece of paper. We were in a meeting  
20 in January, and the Prime Minister was asking him when  
21 do you think Fardel Kanoun should start, and I wrote  
22 on a piece of paper 15 February, and I handed it to

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1 him. And he showed me the paper yesterday. It  
2 started on the 14th. But he said, you told me -- I'll  
3 never forget this piece of paper; you told me the date  
4 that Fardel Kanoun would start; I keep this paper with  
5 me always. I thought that was kind of neat, actually.

6 (b)(6) Yes, sir. And I know that you  
7 were at a three-day surge. I think it was called  
8 Black Anvil -- a three-day surge of operations,  
9 actually throughout Iraq, but focused in conjunction  
10 with Fardel Kanoun.

11 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Right. To get it  
12 kicked off. So I think that was a key decision as  
13 well.

14 Of course, then the decision process --  
15 The other big decision was how -- in the fall, was how  
16 we were going to -- the ramping off of brigades.

17 Actually, I started to think about that, obviously, in  
18 August when I gave my recommendation to General  
19 Petraeus.

20 We thought about it a lot in August. We  
21 validated it September-October-November, and we ramped  
22 off the first brigade in December, and we are getting

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1 ready to ramp off the second one here in about a  
2 month.

3 So it was that process and deciding how we  
4 were going to do that. Although we were ramping --  
5 The decision was made, yes, these are the five  
6 brigades we are going to ramp, but they are not  
7 necessarily going to be brigades that get pulled out  
8 and leave a specific area.

9 We will send a brigade home, but we will  
10 fill those spaces in some spaces with other units, and  
11 we will think the lines slowly, and that was one of  
12 the key decisions we made as we ramped these brigades.  
13 That was made in the fall as well.

14 (b)(6) Right.

15 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: I think those are  
16 probably --

17 (b)(6) Okay, sir. On Phantom  
18 Phoenix, I want to bring it forward a little bit.  
19 That just kicked off about a month ago in early  
20 January, and I know you have already given a press  
21 conference in January on that. I have your comments  
22 on that, but I wonder now, after a month or so of

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1 operations, what would be your assessment of that?

2 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Well, I am very  
3 encouraged. The bottom line is this was again --  
4 There's two things I wanted to -- the reason I wanted  
5 to do Phantom Phoenix in January.

6 First off, we had off-ramped a brigade,  
7 and I wanted to make sure everybody understood that.  
8 Yes, we had off-ramped a brigade, but we still had a  
9 significant amount of capacity to conduct operations.

10 Secondly, it was about the continued  
11 pursuit of al Qaeda. It was clear they had moved.  
12 They had moved up to the Diyala River Valley. They  
13 had moved north, in my mind, to Baji, north up to  
14 Mosul, and there were still some remnants in the  
15 south, and this was really to continue to put pressure  
16 on them and never allow them to establish a  
17 significant safe haven or sanctuary.

18 Now they had tried to reestablish  
19 themselves up in Nineveh Province in Mosul. They are  
20 a little bit dug in there, but we continue to  
21 eliminate these areas.

22 So the focus of this operation was to

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1 eliminate any areas that they think they might be able  
2 to establish themselves and make it extremely  
3 difficult to establish those support zones in order to  
4 support operations anywhere in Iraq but, most  
5 importantly, they will always try to get back into  
6 Baghdad, and so to push that as far away from Baghdad  
7 as possible.

8 So that was really the thought process  
9 behind Phantom Phoenix. So far, I am very pleased.  
10 We have done a very good job in Diyala River Valley.  
11 We've still got some work to do there.

12 In the south, in Arab Jabour, in my mind  
13 we are almost finished there. I think in another 30  
14 days, two weeks or so, I believe it will be finished.  
15 It will be almost defeated down there.

16 (b)(6)

Clear.

17 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: I think that the  
18 that the work is in Mosul, but I am confident with  
19 where we're headed. I think that's going to take  
20 another 60 days or so up in Mosul, and it is not --  
21 You know, people tried to characterize that as a  
22 battle. It is not a battle. It is about protecting

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1 the population, controlling east and west Mosul with  
2 U.S.-Iraqi Security Forces, and then begin the  
3 rebuilding process there.

4 What makes Mosul a little bit more  
5 difficult is there are political issues because of the  
6 Kurd-Sunni issues up in Mosul and the fact that it is  
7 a Sunni dominated province in terms of population, but  
8 all the leaders of the Provincial Council and  
9 government are Kurds.

10 So we have worked closely with the Kurds.  
11 We established the Nineveh Operational Command, which  
12 was another big decision we made, to do during this  
13 time. The selection of the commander was very  
14 thoughtful.

15 General Petraeus and I were personally  
16 involved in this. I had to do a lot of engagement up  
17 with the Kurds. For the Sunni Arab in charge of the  
18 Nineveh Operation Command, we took somebody we trusted  
19 who had operated in Baghdad, commanded the 9th  
20 Division.

21 So I think that is going well so far.  
22 We'll see how that plays out. But again, it's kind of

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1 taking the template of Baghdad, but it is a bit  
2 different, because the problems are a bit different.  
3 But we think at least the majority of the solutions  
4 are the same, protecting the population, establishing  
5 combat outposts, JSSes inside of Mosul.

6 (b)(6) Do you think there is  
7 sufficient combat power, both Iraqi and U.S., out  
8 there in Mosul?

9 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: I do. You know, we  
10 are still just getting started up there. We added --  
11 I made the decision to add an Infantry battalion up  
12 there. So we've moved an infantry battalion up there.

13 I think the two battalions with the 2nd  
14 Iraqi Army Division and the Police are enough. We  
15 will be prepared to reinforce it more, if we need to  
16 do that, but I believe we got to -- With the  
17 capability of the 3d ACR up there now, I think there's  
18 a little bit more capability.

19 I think it is enough. I think that will  
20 be one of the decisions that General Austin (Phonetic)  
21 has to make here in about 30 days after (Inaudible).

22 (b)(6) All right, sir. I'd like to

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1 move on. That's a very good review of all your key  
2 decisions, but I would like to move on for a minute.

3 I haven't asked this question before. On  
4 your relationship with Multinational Force and the  
5 Commander, General Petraeus -- You had talked a lot  
6 earlier in interviews about General Casey, but I  
7 wondered if you would reflect a minute.

8 What does General Petraeus bring to the  
9 battle?

10 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Well, first -- It's  
11 because some of decisions made (Inaudible) General  
12 Petraeus got here. But General Petraeus clearly is a  
13 believer in the counterinsurgency operations. He  
14 understands it, a great supporter of getting the  
15 assets necessary for the Corps to conduct their  
16 missions.

17 He fully supported -- He was involved in  
18 supporting getting a Division Headquarters, Aviation  
19 Brigade. That happened once he got here. He was  
20 involved in getting the MEU so we could complete -- So  
21 complete supporter.

22 You know, he really helped -- He helped

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1 significantly in making sure he reinforced about  
2 getting soldiers out with the population. So he  
3 really provided really great reinforcement to that.  
4 But he also brought energy to the MFI staff, in my  
5 opinion.

6 He brought the strategic energy, which  
7 made them really start looking at really several  
8 different areas: You know, providing the resources to  
9 the Corps, how are you going to focus on the oil  
10 infrastructure, the electrical infrastructure,  
11 reconciliation, supporting us in reconciliation,  
12 supporting us in any way he could with developing our  
13 ability to do population control measures, which in  
14 some cases had significant political implications  
15 initially for safe markets and safe -- You know, he  
16 really worked that extremely hard with the Iraqi  
17 government, backed us totally on everything we wanted  
18 to do, encouraged us, in fact.

19 So the role he played there was  
20 significant. So total collaboration. When he first  
21 came in here, I laid out for him the plan that we had  
22 developed for the surge, and he approved it. He

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1 didn't make any changes. He approved it and backed us  
2 totally, I think did a good job of supporting us when  
3 we did that.

4 Obviously, you know -- And so what he did  
5 is he really caused the MNFI staff, in my opinion, to  
6 really focus on counterinsurgency and what their role  
7 is in counterinsurgency, from changing how business  
8 was done in Task Force 1.4a with the detainees to  
9 changing how we dealt with other -- trying to get  
10 better services, better economic development and  
11 supporting our operations with population control  
12 measures. He really pushed all of those extremely  
13 hard.

14 So it's basically his overall strategic  
15 leadership, which was significant in all of those.  
16 Then I would just finish by saying culminating, in my  
17 mind, at least in the first part of 2007 with his  
18 testimony, which in my mind is one of the most  
19 courageous things I've seen a General Officer do.  
20 He went in, told the truth, stuck to his guns under  
21 heavy criticism, heavy pressure, and handled himself  
22 brilliantly, delivered the message, the one that was

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1 the true message, and I think that was very  
2 significant.

3 I think that is how I would describe him.

4 (b)(6) Okay, good. Very good.

5 I am going to ask a couple of significant  
6 -- or specific, more specific questions. Looking at  
7 your Operations Order 07-01, you say in the mission  
8 statement that you want to establish -- improve  
9 stability, and I think everybody agrees that is fairly  
10 well accomplished, but you wanted to create also  
11 irreversible momentum by December of '07.

12 I wondered if you would address or assess  
13 the Corps' progress on creating the irreversible  
14 momentum.

15 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes. First of all,  
16 I made two mistakes when I did that. First, I did  
17 that in the beginning, because that is when the Corps  
18 was leaving initially. You know, that's when we  
19 thought about when we were leaving. <sup>Now</sup> in Dec /07

20 I realized, after being here a few months,  
21 that that was wrong, that what I really needed to do  
22 is project six months after the Corps leaves, because

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1 I needed to have an op order where it would already  
2 continue to flow through where 18th Airborne Corps  
3 was.

4 So what I meant by irreversible momentum  
5 is something that could not be changed, something that  
6 even though you would have -- an event would happen,  
7 it would not change the course of where we were  
8 headed.

9 In other words, you could have a major  
10 event. Some event happened. It would not change the  
11 course, because we had so much momentum moving  
12 forward, it would not change the course.

13 I think you had to do that by providing  
14 security and stability. You had to do that by  
15 improving services. You had to do that by improving  
16 Iraqi Security Forces and local governments. Those  
17 were the key things I thought we had to gain  
18 irreversible momentum on.

19 So what I would say is I later updated  
20 that to the summer of 2008.

21 (b)(6) Right.

22 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: And I did that for

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1 a very specific reason, first because we weren't going  
2 to get there by December, but more importantly, I  
3 wanted to drive it six months out for the 18th  
4 Airborne Corps.

5 Now what I think we have achieved is we  
6 have changed the security and stability, which has  
7 given people hope. It's not yet irreversible. We  
8 have started with reconciliation.

9 This reconciliation process is moving us  
10 closer, but it's not completed yet. We have to --  
11 They passed a calibrating justice law, but the  
12 implementation of that law will be the key in order to  
13 get irreversible momentum. So I think that's a big  
14 more.

15 Job creation is the other one. Basic  
16 services are improving slowly, but now it's about  
17 jobs, long term jobs, jobs that are honorable jobs,  
18 not just make work jobs. So that is the next key  
19 piece, and then provincial elections.

20 You don't have to have the elections, but  
21 at least you need a date in place, a date where people  
22 understand that they are going to happen.

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1                   So I think those things will create  
2 irreversible momentum. So I think it will happen  
3 sometime in 2008. I'm not sure when that will be.

4                   The last thing I would say -- So I  
5 mentioned creating security and stability and start  
6 reconciliation.

7                   The other thing that happened, again that  
8 gave us momentum, is the rejection of al Qaeda by the  
9 populace. We did not have that when we got here, but  
10 by the summer, maybe late summer, almost thoroughly  
11 throughout Iraq they have rejected al Qaeda, and we  
12 have also started to see now a beginning of a  
13 rejection of militias and Shia extremists as well.

14                  So I think those are the key things that  
15 are really starting to drive us toward that, but still  
16 a little bit more work to do.

17                  (b)(6) Yes, sir. Sir, there have  
18 been some commentary in the States on what 2007 has  
19 meant, and you may be aware of them. Essentially,  
20 what they are -- you know, some of the commentary is  
21 trying to frame already the history of 2007.

22                  One of the themes that seems to come up is

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1 that, hey, you know, the turnaround in Iraq is  
2 basically because the Sunnis have stopped turning  
3 their guns at us, and we are paying them so they won't  
4 turn their guns on us, and that's the key to the  
5 turnaround.

6 It's a question of emphasis. I mean,  
7 everybody seems to throw in, well, the surge -- the  
8 additional troops helped, but the real key was the  
9 turnaround and the Iraqi population, particularly the  
10 Sunnis.

11 What would you say to that?

12 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: First of all, I saw  
13 it in Anbar first. They would not start working with  
14 Coalition forces. They felt that they were going to  
15 have security and stability against al Qaeda. What  
16 they saw with the surge and our progress we made is  
17 that we were serious about what we were doing. We  
18 were establishing security and stability, which caused  
19 them then to say, okay, I feel more comfortable with  
20 rejecting al Qaeda, and there will not be harsh  
21 ramifications for doing that.

22 So this is not a chicken and egg -- It is

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1 very clear. Once you provide population security,  
2 they will reject al Qaeda or any other extremist  
3 organization who is using intimidation as the tool to  
4 control that population.

5 So there is no doubt in my mind that that  
6 made a difference.

7 (b)(6) Yes, sir.

8 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Now let me get to  
9 another point. It really bothers me about this buying  
10 of -- This is not about buying anything. This is  
11 about people who have made a decision that they don't  
12 want to fight al Qaeda.

13 How did al Qaeda get them to help them in  
14 the beginning? Because they needed to support their  
15 families. They would do anything to support their  
16 families. They got to feed them. They got to have a  
17 place to stay.

18 So I can't just say, you know, we want you  
19 to defeat al Qaeda but, oh, by the way, you got to do  
20 it for free. I mean they got to survive somehow. so  
21 you got to give them some kind of money to do this.

22 Now I told all my commanders when we

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1 started this process: The worst case scenario is  
2 that, since the requirement to get any salary at all,  
3 you have to be fingerprinted, you have to get a  
4 retinal scan, you have to give us your name, you have  
5 to give us all your IDs -- So the worst case -- These  
6 people are already fighting us. So the worst case is  
7 they fight us again, but we have all their data. We  
8 know exactly who they are -- exactly who they are.

9 So even in worst case, we are better off  
10 than we were when we started this program. Now I  
11 don't think we are going to be worst case. I think  
12 what's going to happen is you are going to find about  
13 75-80 percent of these people are genuine, maybe even  
14 higher or very genuine, in what they wanted to do.

15 They want to be recognized by the  
16 government of Iraq. They are tired of fighting. They  
17 want to be part of the solution. They see this as a  
18 way to gain legitimacy.

19 There might be 10-15 percent that don't,  
20 and we will deal with them. But I feel very confident  
21 with that statement. We have seen nothing at all that  
22 would tell me anything different.

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1 [REDACTED] I know. When an event  
2 happens, there is already people trying to interpret  
3 the history of it.

4 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Well, and it's  
5 because Sadr declared a ceasefire. Well, listen.  
6 They don't just do this stuff. There's reasons why,  
7 and the reasons are they had no choice, frankly, and  
8 it had to do with some of our operations.

9 You know, let's go back to December and  
10 January before the surge started. They weren't -- We  
11 could have bought them off then. Why didn't we do it  
12 then? Why didn't Sadr have a ceasefire in January of  
13 '07? Why did it happen in August, really September 1.

14 Why did al Qaeda start being rejected once  
15 Ramadi fell, once Baqubah fell, once Arab Jabour fell,  
16 once we provided better security in Baghdad? It's  
17 kind of funny. That's when it started happening.

18 [REDACTED] I think the most telling thing  
19 is the numbers of CLC has increased over the summer  
20 months and into the fall, and that came after  
21 essentially the surge operations began to take effect.

22 Sir, I wondered if you could take a few

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Command  
philosophy 39

1 minutes and describe how you exercise command over  
2 Multinational Corps. If you could, sort of a  
3 philosophy of the command.

4 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: First, I knew coming  
5 in -- a very diverse organization, very complex, very  
6 different problems in different areas. So the most  
7 important thing for me was my Commander's intent, and  
8 making sure that commanders, three levels down --  
9 although I started at two levels, three levels down  
10 understood my intent and what I wanted them to do.

11 So it was about, first, communicating that  
12 intent and giving them enough latitude within that  
13 intent to execute what they needed to, to be  
14 successful in their area, where one brigade's area is  
15 much different than another brigade's area, one  
16 battalion's area is much different than another  
17 battalion's area, and giving the latitude to do that.

18 So I think that's the most important  
19 thing, is I got to provide them the latitude, right  
20 and left limits, to conduct their operations and still  
21 guiding them on what we wanted to do.

22 For example, I want you to protect the

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1 population. Here are your right and left limits on  
2 what you can do in population control measures.  
3 Here's your right and left limits on what you can do  
4 on reconciliation.

5 Then, obviously -- Then it comes down to  
6 resourcing and how I allocate combat power, how I  
7 allocate ISR, how I allocate all intelligence systems,  
8 how I allocate money, cert money. All of that stuff  
9 is then how you do that.

10 The second piece is then it's about  
11 getting out into the battlefield. Five or six times  
12 a week, I did battlefield circulation in the  
13 afternoon, four or five hours every day.

14 In order to understand what is going on,  
15 I've got to talk to commanders. This is about talking  
16 to other commanders, division commanders, brigade  
17 commanders, battalion commanders, understanding what  
18 they are seeing, understanding what their issues are.  
19 It enables me to see the battlefield. It's still  
20 about being able to see the battlefield.

21 So that's why we -- That is how I was able  
22 to make key decisions. That's how I was able to

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1 understand what the effects of my decisions were over  
2 the past year -- you know, a decentralized approach to  
3 operations, but providing an intent and guidance that  
4 enabled them to conduct those decentralized  
5 operations.

6 (b)(6) All right, sir. Sir, you  
7 mentioned you traveled a great deal in the last 15  
8 months. I wondered if you -- and you said you were  
9 out five to six days a week. Have you managed to  
10 visit just about every U.S. battalion out there?

11 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: I have visited every  
12 U.S. battalion, and I have visited every -- almost  
13 every Coalition battalion as well.

14 (b)(6) And that gives you the view.  
15 So when you come back to your staff and your staff  
16 makes an assessment, then you can judge that on what  
17 you have seen on the ground. Is that correct?

18 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: The advantage I have  
19 is the staff gets reports.

20 (b)(6) Right.

21 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: And our reporting --  
22 I was very pleased with our reporting system, but it's

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1 not the same as when I get to talk to a battalion  
2 commander and he can tell me exactly what happened.  
3 It just doesn't get captured in that report -- or a  
4 brigade commander, division commander, who can tell me  
5 really what happened.

6 Sometimes it's night and day from what the  
7 report -- The context, the details make a difference,  
8 the details of who they really fought, the details of  
9 why they think something happened. You can't capture  
10 that in reports, necessarily. So that's what makes it  
11 so important.

12 (b)(6) Yes, sir. I want to talk a  
13 little bit about the staff and your view of this Corps  
14 staff. I know you have had a great deal of experience  
15 in command, commanding a division. So you have seen  
16 a lot of staffs, and I'd like you -- and I know every  
17 commander thinks his staff is good, but evaluate this  
18 Corps staff.

19 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes. I said it the  
20 other day. I really believe that this is the best  
21 staff I've ever had, and I've been a Corps chief as  
22 well. So I've been a Corps Chief of Staff as well.

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1 Let me describe why it is. First of all,  
2 the experience level at every level was significant.  
3 All of them had deployable experience over here in key  
4 positions. All of them understood Iraq. All of them  
5 had a wealth of experience in their area of expertise.

6 You know, Mike Murray who had been a  
7 brigade commander, was actually Acting Corps Chief of  
8 Staff for a while; Jerry Tait, second deployment as  
9 the Corps G2, C-2, tremendous experience.

10 My Corps Chief, Joe Anderson, had been  
11 here as brigade commander, was a division chief of  
12 staff, but now the Corps Chief; Mark McDonald, who had  
13 been deployed here as the DivArty Commander doing  
14 Effects; Jim Simmons who had been over here before  
15 with the Corps.

16 So all these leaders have had really good  
17 experience, which really enabled them to really  
18 understand, and very quickly. But the biggest thing  
19 about this staff was two things.

20 One, they were team players. There was  
21 never egos. They were in it for the team. They were  
22 in it for the Corps. Then the second piece of that is

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1 the guidance I gave early on, is we are here to  
2 support divisions and brigades, and that your focus  
3 must be on the divisions and the brigades, and they  
4 never forgot that.

5 Obviously, not everything went perfectly  
6 and, obviously, there was probably some issues. But  
7 for the most part, they have focused on providing what  
8 was necessary for brigades and divisions, proven by  
9 how they planned the surge and executed the surge  
10 flawlessly, bringing in five brigades, two Marine  
11 battalions and a MEU without a hiccough -- places to  
12 stay, FOBs, our ability to quickly move out and have  
13 COPs and JSSes, almost 200 of them. We have 200 of  
14 those around the country, and they have to get  
15 resources to build those, and the work they did with  
16 that.

17 The sharing of intelligence, the  
18 allocation of ISR, the allocations of intelligence  
19 assets, the ability to quickly change battle space,  
20 allocate battle space between divisions -- all of  
21 those, in my mind, was done easily from my viewpoint  
22 because of the cooperation and relationships that were

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1 built between the divisions and the Corps, all the  
2 Embassies and the Corps, and it had to do with their  
3 experience. So that's --

4 (b)(6) Yes, sir. On a more specific  
5 part of your staff, the COIC or the Counter-IED Cell  
6 that you had, could you comment a little bit on

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

8 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Yes, I would. Then  
9 there is another one I want to comment on, too.

10 First off, one of the things I wanted to  
11 do was I really -- Coming in, I felt that -- As I was  
12 training to come here, I felt that the IED process was  
13 the most important thing we were involved in, because  
14 the IED, whether it's a car bomb, truck bomb, roadside  
15 bomb, S-vest, is the weapon of choice for our enemy.

16 If you defeat that, you will get to the  
17 enemy. You will get to the leadership. So I wanted  
18 to make sure we put emphasis on it. So I wanted to  
19 bring somebody in who I felt was a combat thinker who  
20 understood combat operations, who could run the cell.

21 So (b)(3), (b)(6) had been a brigade commander  
22 for me in 4th Infantry. I thought he was the perfect

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1 fit. What he was able to do -- He understood this. So  
2 not only was he able to, in my mind, understand how to  
3 go after a network, but he was able -- and then it  
4 related into three operations, because it painted a  
5 picture of what al Qaeda was doing, what the Shia  
6 extremists were doing, because again the IEDs were --  
7 that's how they -- That was their weapon of choice.

8 So developing that capability was  
9 significant for me in gaining another understanding of  
10 the fight. So in my mind, it was critical for us in  
11 understanding the fight, and it was critical to our  
12 success we've had in reducing a significant amount of  
13 IEDs.

14 Early on, the divisions, even in our  
15 train-up with the divisions, they knew this was a  
16 focus, and they jumped on board, and brigades jumped  
17 on board. So it really became a synergy, in my mind,  
18 of really gong after the networks involved. So I  
19 thought that was very important part.

20 (b)(6)

21 Yes, sir. And I wondered,  
22 since I know that the COIC was a creation of 3d Corps  
and yourself, is the (Inaudible) on board? Are they

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1 going to keep it? I know a lot of money has been  
2 invested.

3 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Unclear on whether  
4 they are or not. You know, they have said they think  
5 they are, but --

6 The other one -- There is one other piece,  
7 one other special staff section I do want to talk  
8 about, is the Information Operations.

9 I believe one of the keys to our success  
10 is how we have progressed over the last 15 months in  
11 information operations, our ability to use satellite  
12 TV, radio, op eds, to drive our messages, to influence  
13 specific areas, influence the rejection of al Qaeda,  
14 rejection of Shia extremists, rejection of militias,  
15 talking about unity, talking about building up the  
16 Iraqi security force and getting confidence in that,  
17 and our ability to run that process.

18 I think we have taken it to a new level,  
19 in my opinion, that we have not done before, and I'm  
20 very pleased. Obviously, there's always ways you can  
21 improve, but much of the work that we did there, I  
22 think, is ground breaking, and I think we need to

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1 continue to review this.

2 I am still not happy with how we organize  
3 this within the Army to attack this problem, but I  
4 like what we have done here. I think we have done  
5 some very dramatic things.

6 (b)(6) A manifestation of that is the  
7 number of brigade, division and staff interviews. Is  
8 that correct? I mean, I don't have much to compare it  
9 with, but I do know that a great many of them always  
10 are talking to the press, and both Arabic, Iraqi and  
11 U.S. I mean, I see 15 people talking.

12 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: Well, there's two  
13 different things. I mean, that's -- IO is really a  
14 separate -- It's not separate, but it is a bit  
15 different. So that is -- You have your IO, which is  
16 done completely separately, that is injected into the  
17 Iraqi press.

18 Then the other piece was the public  
19 affairs piece, which was really talking about what we  
20 were doing and getting our message out. So they are  
21 complementary but separate.

22 (b)(6) But when you talk to the

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1 western press, the Arab press picks up on it also.

2 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: They do. They do.

3 (b)(6) So there is some spillover.

4 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: There is, but we  
5 have -- and by the way, General Petraeus helped with  
6 that as well significantly, that outreach piece and  
7 his emphasis on that and pushing that.

8 So I would just say that that was a major,  
9 major piece that we did. You know, I think I did 12  
10 Pentagon press conferences or something like that in  
11 15 months, quite more than they had seen before, and  
12 I changed how I did it.

13 I really gave them operational updates and  
14 then took questions. They used to do them for 30  
15 minutes. I did mine for an hour. I was trying to  
16 tell them what we were doing, why we were doing it.  
17 But then we had battalion and brigade trainers out all  
18 the time.

19 Again, I tried to give them broad -- I  
20 didn't want to be -- I didn't really publish talking  
21 points. I don't like that. I want them, especially  
22 in this environment, I want them to talk about their

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1 area, because I don't know their area. So I don't  
2 want to limit them. I just want them to be free to be  
3 able to talk about what they are doing.

4 The only restriction I put on them was  
5 stay in your lane. You shouldn't be talking about  
6 somebody else's area or some of the things above your  
7 level; just stay in your lane, and they followed that,  
8 for the most part.

9 (b)(6) Sir, you've commanded a  
10 division over here in Iraq in combat, and the Corps.  
11 I wondered if you can comment on the American soldiers  
12 over here, and Marines, on the quality.

13 Have you seen increased or decreased the  
14 training, the motivation of our soldiers, the junior  
15 leadership. I mean, there's been a lot of talk on the  
16 strain the war has put on our soldiers and our Army,  
17 but have you seen that manifest self in any  
18 degradation in quality?

19 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: First of all, the  
20 sophistication, adaptability of our leaders is  
21 probably the best it has ever been at the captain  
22 level, at the staff sergeant/sergeant first class

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1 level, at the major, lieutenant colonel level.

2 It's just really amazing, and it has to do  
3 with multiple deployments, multiple experiences in  
4 combat, multiple experiences operating under stress.  
5 But what has impressed me the most is in between  
6 deployments how they have learned, how they continue  
7 to learn.

8 I tell everybody that I have seen -- I was  
9 trying to count -- I think it's 39 maneuverable  
10 brigade commanders, nine aviation brigade commanders,  
11 11 sustainment brigade commanders, and there's others  
12 I'm forgetting. I have not seen a bad one yet.

13 They are all here on multiple tours again.  
14 They understand what they have to do. They are  
15 adaptable. They are adjusting. Yes, some do better  
16 than others, but for the most part, they are really  
17 understanding what we are trying to do here. That has  
18 made it a joy to be over here.

19 Down to our individual soldiers, you know,  
20 I read all the time, people are worried about high  
21 school diplomas and quality. I got to tell you that  
22 it is not manifesting itself here in Iraq.

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1                   These young men -- First of all, every day  
2                   how articulate they are, how understanding they are of  
3                   what is going on, how aware they are of what is going  
4                   on. Their ability to shift quickly from one of the  
5                   most -- a lethal environment to a non-lethal  
6                   environment is very difficult to do, but they are able  
7                   to do that, and that goes for Marine Corps. This is  
8                   in the Marine Corps as well.

9                   So I feel very good about the future of  
10                  our Army. I do worry about the strain on the Army.  
11                  It doesn't have to do with soldiers' capacity or  
12                  ability. It has to do with families, and can we keep  
13                  families in the Army? Are they willing to continue to  
14                  put up with the sacrifices? I think that's the key,  
15                  and that's what we have to be concerned about.

16                  (b)(6) Yes, sir. Sir, it's been  
17                  about an hour. I've got lots more questions, but I  
18                  wanted to kind of wrap it up here. I know you are  
19                  busy, but if you have any other thoughts that you  
20                  would to provide on this last interview.

21                  LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: I think the last  
22                  thing I would say is: One of the things that I see

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1 every day from our soldiers is they feel good about  
2 what they are doing right now.

3 These soldiers that came here on these 15  
4 -- The other decision was to extend from 12 to 15  
5 months. That was a very significant decision.

6 (b)(6) Right.

7 LT. GENERAL ODIERNO: It was one we had to  
8 do to maintain the capacity of the forces on the  
9 ground, a very difficult decision, understanding the  
10 strain. But the units that stayed 15 months, what  
11 those soldiers got to see -- They realized how  
12 difficult it was when they got here, but they saw  
13 significant improvement when they left, and they  
14 really saw that this place can move forward, and I  
15 think they feel much better about where we're at.

16 They do know there is more work, and they  
17 do know there's some frustrating things about it. You  
18 know, we don't think the government of Iraq is moving  
19 as fast as it could be, but they are moving. It's  
20 just going to take time.

21 The second thing is that the heroism of  
22 our soldiers is incredible every day, and the

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1 sacrifices that they make.

2 I want to make sure -- and I think  
3 everybody over here wants to make sure -- those who  
4 have been seriously injured, those that have been  
5 killed -- they will not have given in vain, and that  
6 this thing will culminate in such a way that it has  
7 made a difference to the Iraqis. It has made a  
8 difference to our security. I think that is very  
9 important to all of us that we do that.

10 (b)(6) Thank you, sir.

11 This concludes the interview. Thank you,  
12 General Odierno.

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